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Reviewing: RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS,
RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACrION (1996)
I. INTRODUCTION
Affirmative action is in trouble. Recent onslaughts against it
have succeeded in a number of forums. The Supreme Court has de-
creed that race-based affirmative action, whether by the federal gov-
ernment or by the states, will be subject to strict scrutiny,1 a standard
described as "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact.",2 A federal appeals
court has struck down the use of race as a factor in academic admis-
sions in Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi! Voters in California have
amended the state constitution to forbid discrimination in favor of or
against persons due to race or gender.4
* See Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., 1 Q.B. 256, 257 (1893) (U.K.)
("During the last epidemic of influenza many thousand carbolic smoke balls were
sold as preventatives against this disease, and in no ascertained case was the dis-
ease contracted by those using the carbolic smoke ball.").
** Law Clerk to the Honorable J. Clifford Wallace, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit. J.D. 1995, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall).
e-mail: TungYin @aol.com. I would like to extend sincere thanks and gratitude
to OCU Law Professor Dennis Arrow, Bob Schaeffer of FairTest, Vince Farhat,
Kevin Lysowski, Jerry Stephens, Jay Walters, and the editors and staff of the
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review. I also owe special thanks to Professor Paul
Mishkin, who graciously allowed me the use of research I had originally per-
formed at his behest. The views and opinions expressed here should not be im-
puted to any of the above-mentioned persons and all mistakes are mine.
1. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,227 (1995).
2. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Chang-
ing Court" A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
3. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 935 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 116 S. Ct.
2581 (1996). But see Jayne Noble, Education Board Weights Effort to Enroll Mi-
norities, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 18, 1997, at 35A (noting the intention of
the dean of St. Mary's University law school to continue to use race-based pref-
erences, who stated "I don't think Hopwood is the law at all").
4. See generally Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th
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Nevertheless, a number of people who favor ending race-based
affirmative action acknowledge that an alternative to race-based
preferences is necessary and desirable. One current trend is to shift
from race-based preferences to class-based ones-giving a "plus"
during admissions consideration to students from lower-class fami-
lies.5 This proposal dates back at least to Justice William 0. Doug-
las, 6 and has resurged in the 1990se after drawing intermittent sup-
port, including from Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas
before they were named to the United States Supreme Court.8 One
commentator in particular, Richard Kahlenberg, is a prolific propo-
nent of the approach.9 His latest book, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE,
AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, provides a comprehensive and coherent
approach for implementing affirmative action programs at both the
Cir.) (discussing California's Proposition 209 and vacating a preliminary injunc-
tion to enjoin its implementation), cert. denied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3316 (U.S. Nov. 3,
1997) (No. 97-396).
5. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action Based on Economic
Disadvantage, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1913, 1913-14 (1996); Lincoln Caplan et al., The
Hopwood Effect Kicks in on Campus, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 23, 1996,
at 26,28; Nathan Glazer, Race, Not Class, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 1995, at A12.
6. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 331, 337 (1974) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that while applications for admission should be considered in a
"racially neutral manner," the Equal Protection Clause could allow consideration
of "barriers that [the applicant] had to overcome").
7. See, e.g., DINESH D'SouzA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF
RACE AND SEX ON CAMPUS 251-53 (1991); Mickey Kaus, Class is In, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Mar. 27, 1995, at 6, 6; David K. Shipler, My Equal Opportunity, Your
Free Lunch, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1995, § 4, at 1.
& See Antonin Scalia, THE DISEASE AS CURE: "In Order to Get Beyond
Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race.", 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 156 ("I
strongly favor... what might be called. . . 'affirmative action programs' of many
types of help for the poor and disadvantaged."); Clarence Thomas, Affirmative
Action Goals and Timetables: Too Tough? Not Tough Enough!, 5 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 402, 410-11 (1987) ("Any preferences given should be directly re-
lated to the obstacles that have been unfairly placed in those individuals' paths,
rather than on the basis of race or gender. . . ."); see also WILLIAM JULIUS
WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE: BLACKS AND CHANGING
AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS 144-54, 154 (1980) (arguing that class is more impor-
tant than race because "[t]he situation of marginality and redundancy created by
the modem industrial society deleteriously affects all the poor, regardless of
race").
9. See RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996) [hereinafter KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY]; see
also Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, 84 CAL. L. REV.
1037 (1996) [hereinafter Kahlenberg, Class-Based]; Richard D. Kahlenberg, Get-
ting Beyond Racial Preferences: The Class-Based Compromise, 45 AM. U. L.
REV. 721 (1996); Richard Kahlenberg, Class, Not Race: An Affirmative Action




undergraduate and graduate school admissions level, as well as for
entry-level employment.
In this Book Review I use Kahlenberg's framework to argue that
class-based affirmative action, while theoretically justifiable, is em-
pirically doomed and should be rejected regardless of how one feels
about race-based affirnative action. This directly contrasts with
Kahlenberg, who states, "[s]witching to class from race would be a
grand bargain that satisfies both liberals and conservatives."" Sup-
porters of race-based affirmative action may see class-based affirma-
tive action as a second-best alternative;" however, the available
demographic, statistical, and anecdotal evidence suggests that class-
based affirmative action will not benefit racial minorities to any sig-
nificant degree. 2 Opponents of race-based affirmative action may
view class-based affirmative action as an acceptable compromise;'
yet, virtually every argument against race-based affirmative action is
applicable to class-based preferences. Thus, class-based affirmative
action is actually worse than the alternatives: keeping race-based af-
firmative action or eliminating such preferences altogether.
Preliminarily, note that I will analyze race- and class-based af-
firmative action only insofar as it affects whites and blacks. This fo-
cus is consistent with the majority of scholarship on affirmative ac-
tion. 4 The advantage of this approach is that the reader can see the
10. G. Pascal Zachary, Class Action: Need, as a Substitute for Race Prefer-
ences, Is Just as Hot an Issue, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 1997, at Al.
11. See Fallon, Jr., supra note 5, at 1914.
12- See, e.g., Chris Klein, Law School Diversity Hinges on Race Policy, NAT'L
L.J., Jan. 27, 1997, at Al (discussing a study by Linda Wightman finding that mi-
nority enrollment would drop significantly under class-based affirmative action);
Caplan, supra note 5, at 28 (noting that the University of California at Berkeley
concluded that class-based affirmative action would decrease the percentage of
Latinos and blacks in its incoming 1996 class).
13. See Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47
STAN. L. REV. 855,897 (1995).
14. See, e.g., Myrl L. Duncan, The Future of Affirmative Action: A Jurispru-
dential/Legal Critique, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 503, 507 (1982) ("The dis-
cussion exemplifies its general points by reference to a specific minority group:
blacks."); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Destabilizing Racial Classifications Based on In-
sights Gleaned from Trademark Law, 84 CAL. L. REv. 887, 888 (1996) ("When
one examines how race is constructed and defined in society, it is startling to note
that racial categories traditionally have been divided into camps: white and
black."); Richard A. Posner, Duncan Kennedy on Affirmative Action, 1990 DuKE
L.J. 1157, 1158 ("I propose to elide all these issues by confining my attention to
blacks."). But see Jerry Kang, Negative Action Against Asian Americans: The
Internal Instability of Dworkin's Defense of Affirmative Action, 31 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 1 (1996) (examining interaction of preferential treatment for non-
Asian minorities and ceilings on admissions for Asians); Alexandra Natapoff,
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general effects of racial and socioeconomic preferences without hav-
ing to confront the related issue of whether Asians and Latinos are as
equally disadvantaged as blacks. 5
II. RACE-BASED AFFIRMATIVE AcrION
Race-based "affirmative action" is actually a catch-all phrase for
a number of programs that select people on the basis of racial iden-
tity.'" Begun a little over thirty years ago," affirmative action has
spawned a tremendous amount of writing by both proponents and
opponents."
A. What is Affirmative Action?
Generally speaking, affirmative action refers to any system of
selection that deviates from the normal procedures to address per-
ceived deficiencies in those procedures.' 9 In the context of academic
admissions, the "normal" selection criteria might include standard-
ized test scores, high school grades, and letters of recommendation."
The admission of exceptionally talented athletes whose academic
performances are far below that of nonathletes is a form of affirma-
tive action.2' The admission of children of wealthy alumni is
Note, Trouble in Paradise: Equal Protection and the Dilemma of Interminority
Group Conflict, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1059 (1995) (suggesting an alternative to the
traditional black-white model).
15. See, e.g., Brest & Oshige, supra note 13, at 900 ("[N]o other group com-
pares to African Americans in the confluence of the characteristics that argue for
inclusion in affirmative action programs."); Roy L. Brooks, Race as an Under-
Inclusive and Over-Inclusive Concept, 1 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 9, 15 (1994)
("African Americans... are the only social group, racial or nonracial, that did
not come to this country of their own free will."); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defend-
ing the Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action: Attacking Racism in the Nineties,
1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 1043, 1071-73 (arguing that quotas are acceptable for blacks
because their experience has been different from all other minorities); Posner,
supra note 14, at 1157-58.
16. See, e.g., James Q. Wilson, Sins of Admission: Good Affirmative Action
and Bad, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 8, 1996, at 12, 12.
17. See Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-1963) (establishing the
President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity which was to rec-
ommend affirmative steps for furthering the national policy of nondiscrimina-
tion). But see DARIEN A. MCWHIRTER, THE END OF AFFIRMATIVE ACrION 30
(1996) (suggesting that affirmative action dates back to a 1941 secret agreement
between President Roosevelt and a black union leader).
18. See KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY, supra note 9, at 322-38, and
MCWHIRTER, supra note 17, at 177-80, for extensive bibliographies.
119. See Brest & Oshige, supra note 13, at 856.
20. See ROBERT KLITGAARD, CHOOSING ELrrEs 10 (1985).




Indeed, a broad reading of affirmative action includes outreach
programs designed to encourage minorities and women to apply for
positions they might not otherwise seek. For example, "[a] college
might send students or professors into an inner-city neighborhood to
help high school students understand what college is all about and
gain the confidence needed to apply. ' These programs are designed
to address the so-called "pool" problem commonly used to explain
why minorities are systematically underrepresented in higher educa-
tion and professional careers.' The pool explanation posits that
there is an insufficient number of qualified minorities to select from;
hence, minorities are not underrepresented when the racial composi-
tion of the eligible pool is considered.2 However, outreach programs
versity routinely rejecting students with straight-A averages-admitted Russell
White, a star high school football player who failed to score over 700 out of a
possible 1600 on the Scholastic Aptitude Test in four tries and who compiled a C-
average in high school. See Gene Wojciechowski, He Became Student of the
Game, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1990, at Cl. White was later diagnosed with dys-
lexia, which perhaps accounts for his relatively poor academic performance. See
id. However, it is doubtful that an undiagnosed non-athlete would have been
given the chance to enter the university.
22. Preferences for the children of alumni, often described as "legacies," have
been called a "dirty little secret." Elaine Woo, Belief in Meritocracy an Equal-
Opportunity Myth, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1995, at Al. In 1988, for example, Har-
vard University's legacy preference led to the admission of almost 200 students
who arguably would have been rejected otherwise. See id.
Those supporting the legacy preference typically defend it by suggesting
that alumni tend to donate money to the school if their children are more likely
to be admitted, and that this money can be used to fund scholarships for poor
students. See id. A full-scale critique of this policy is beyond the scope of this
Book Review, but this justification is particularly weak. Although it is entirely
rational for institutions to give preferences to legacies, the fact that the money
can be used for positive ends cannot by itself be a justification for granting spe-
cial preferences to the wealthy. Kahlenberg and I agree on this point. See
KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY, supra note 9, at 124.
23. MCWHIRTER, supra note 17, at 5.
24. For a description of the pool problem, see Daniel A. Farber, The Out-
moded Debate Over Affirmative Action, 82 CAL. L. REv. 893, 918-24 (1994).
25. See id. Professor Farber notes that Critical Race Theorists (CRTs) often
charge that the pool problem can be solved by changing the hiring or admissions
criteria, which they see as exhibiting biases against minorities. See id. at 918.
While agreeing that this charge has some accuracy, Farber responds that CRTs
tend to view the pool problem in the context of academic hiring and, in particu-
lar, law school hiring. See id. at 919. When the context shifts to scientific disci-
plines, Farber believes that it is considerably more difficult to alter the standards
so as to increase the pool of minority applicants. See id. at 919-21. But see Rich-
ard Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle, 101 YALE L.J. 1357, 1363-64 (1992)
(explaining that there is an adequate number of qualified minorities to choose
from, but racial biases prevent minorities from being better represented in higher
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do not appear controversial? and, therefore, I will not devote further
analysis to them.2
Most people probably associate affirmative action with race-
conscious preferences-deviations made from "standard" selection
procedures on the basis of an applicant's racial or ethnic identity.2
At various times, institutions have used different systems or ap-
proaches:
* In the early 1970s, the University of California at Davis' medi-
cal school had incoming classes of one hundred students, but reserved
sixteen spots for minorities;29
* The Public Works Employment Act of 1977 set aside 10% of
federal funds for public facility projects for minority-owned busi-
nesses;30
- In laying off its teachers, a school board released the least
senior teachers, except it retained minority teachers to ensure that
the percentage of minorities laid off would not exceed the percentage
of minorities employed prior to the layoffs;
31
* Another school board, faced with laying off one of two equally
qualified teachers with equal seniority, invoked an affirmative action
plan to discharge the white teacher rather than make a random selection,
education and professional careers).
26. See MCWHIRTER, supra note 17, at 5. But see Monterey Mechanical Co.
v. Wilson, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11464, 11468 (9th Cir. Sept. 3, 1997) ("We are
not faced with a non-discriminatory outreach program, requiring that advertise-
ments for bids be distributed in such a manner as to assure that all persons...
have a fair opportunity to bid .... The outreach the statute requires is not from
all equally, or to all equally."); Eugene Volokh, The California Civil Rights Ini-
tiative: An Interpretive Guide, 44 UCLA L. Rnv. 1335, 1353 (1997) (contending
outreach programs where "[a] university sends additional recruiters to particular
schools precisely because those schools have more students of a particular
group" are "clearly discriminatory").
27. One reason outreach programs are noncontroversial may be that they are
perceived as nonthreatening. Beneficiaries of outreach programs do not receive
any advantage in admissions or hiring, and are merely seen as having an equal
opportunity to compete for such spots. See MCWHIRTER, supra note 17, at 5-6
(contrasting affirmative recruitment with affirmative preference).
28. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT 170 (1980) ("But no
matter what we call it-a preference, a quota, a quest for diversity-weighing,
say, blackness affirmatively necessarily means that others are going to be denied
the opportunities in question because they were not born black."); PAUL M.
SNIDERMAN & THOMAS PIAZZA, THE SCAR OF RACE 112 (1993) ("Affirmative
action allocates jobs and the means to obtain them on the basis of race .....
29. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,275 (1978).
30. See Public Works Employment Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(1)(B)(2)
(1994); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,453 (1980).
31. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,270-71 (1986).
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as would have been done had both been the same race.
The affirmative action in these cases varied from quotas to
goals." With a quota, "[a] rigid formula is applied to determine how
many minority group members ought to be admitted to an institu-
tion,"' whereas a goal is a "'target[] reasonably attainable by means
of applying every good faith effort.' 35 Some observers contend the
difference between goals and quotas is illusory, as goals are typically
reached by "reverse engineering" the bonus given to underrepre-
sented minorities to account for the difference in test scores and
grades.36 In other words, the organization sets a goal and then de-
termines the size of the bonus likely to achieve the goal.37 Thus, ac-
cording to these observers, institutions that set goals are reaching the
same result as if they had used quotas, but through subterfuge.
Others believe the distinction is significant, particularly because quo-
tas may present the only effective approach for remedying the under-
representation of minorities.f
B. Rationales for Affirmative Action
A number of different rationales have developed to justify the
use of race-based preferences in admissions, employment, and con-
tracting. The major justifications are: (1) ensuring racial diversity;
(2) compensating minorities, particularly blacks, for societal dis-
crimination; and (3) offsetting biases in the traditional evaluation cri-
teria.
1. Diversity
One justification for race-based affirmative action is that it pro-
motes racial diversity in areas where minorities would otherwise be
32. See Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1551 (3d Cir. 1996) (en
banc), cert granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997).
33. See Duncan, supra note 14, at 507.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 508 (quoting 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.12(e) (1980)).
36. See Richard A. Epstein, Affirmative Action in Law Schools: The Uneasy
Truce, 2 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 33,38 (1992).
37. See id. at 37-38.
38. See, e.g., KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY, supra note 9, at xi ("Harvard's
'plus system'. . . managed to come up with a remarkably consistent percentage of
black students year after year."); Robert D. Alt, Toward Equal Protection: A
Review of Affirmative Action, 36 WASHBURN L.J. 179, 181 n.14 (1997) ("While it
may be true that in theory quotas are rigid and goals are more flexible, the de-
generation from goals to quotas is virtually inevitable.").
39. See Duncan, supra note 14, at 509.
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underrepresented. For example, racial diversity in universities bene-
fits everyone. It places students into contact with persons of vastly
different life experiences and cultures." This interaction is important
"because race itself is socially significant[;] students need knowledge
of the attitudes, views, and backgrounds of racial minorities."'"
Theoretically, whites will not only benefit from exposure to dif-
ferent ethnic cultures, but also develop positive feelings toward mi-
norities who prove competent and able. A California Parks and Rec-
reation Department study concluded that "bringing women and
people of color into workplaces through affirmative action policies
reduced white men's belief in the 'inferiority of nonwhites and
women."''42 Advocates of the diversity theory also contend that in-
creasing the racial diversity of universities and graduate schools will
benefit impoverished minority communities, because minority stu-
dents are more likely to serve their own communities." In a legal
context, these minority students may be able to serve their commu-
nities more effectively than non-minorities because "[t]he ability to
'speak the language' of the client, to understand his perception of his
problem, and to deal with others in the community on his behalf are
qualities essential to being a 'good lawyer."'" Also, increasing minor-
ity participation through diversity provides role models whose visible
success encourages others to follow in their footsteps.4
Until recently, many believed that racial diversity was a suffi-
ciently compelling justification for the use of racial preferences in
education,4 based on Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the Uni-
versity of California v. Bakke.' Hopwood v. Texas recently called
40. See Brest & Oshige, supra note 13, at 862.
41. Terrance Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Re-
sponsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 686 (1975).
42. Brest & Oshige, supra note 13, at 871 (quoting BRON RAYMOND
TAYLOR, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AT WORK 196 (1991)).
43. See Terrance Sandalow, Minority Preferences in Law School Admissions,
in CONSTIrUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 277,283-84 (1980).
44. Id. at 282.
45. See Brest & Oshige, supra note 13, at 869.
46. See Leland Ware, Tales from the Crypt: Does Strict Scrutiny Sound the
Death Knell for Affirmative Action in Higher Education?, 23 J.C. & U.L. 43, 47-
48 (1996) ("A majority did not agree to the relevant level of review, but in what
became the most frequently cited opinion, Justice Powell argued that strict scru-
tiny should be applied."); Adam Winkler, Sounds of Silence: The Supreme Court
and Affirmative Action, 28 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 923, 933 (1995) ("All conversa-
tions on the constitutional doctrine of affirmative action begin with Justice
Powell's solo opinion announcing the judgment of the Court in [Bakke].").
47. 438 U.S. 265,269-324 (1978).
[Vol. 31:213
CLASS-BASED AFFIRMATIVE A CTION
this assumption into doubt. The Fifth Circuit concluded that Justice
Powell's opinion was no longer good law, and that remedying specific
past discrimination was the only compelling interest justifying racial
preferences. 9 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case;
therefore, Bakke apparently remains the law outside of the Fifth Cir-
cuit. However, Hopwood may be a harbinger for the future.
2. Remedying past discrimination
A second justification for race-based affirmative action is that it
functions as a remedy for past and present societal discrimination.
As Professors Brest and Oshige note, "[lt aims to make victims
whole, to place them in the position they would have occupied absent
the injustice."51 This justification postulates that, but for the lingering
effects of slavery and discrimination, blacks would not be dispropor-
tionately poor and less educated compared to whites.52 Thus, stu-
dents benefitting from affirmative action are admitted despite their
lower test scores and grades because, it is assumed, without societal
discrimination these students would have performed better than they
did. 3 The remedy justification also responds to charges that affirma-
tive action discriminates against whites.- Those whites losing out on
admissions to minorities might not have outperformed those minori-
ties had there not been societal discrimination.'
48. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
49. See id. at 944.
50. Professor Mishkin speculates that "the likely source of the Hopwood de-
nial is that (at least) one 'centrist' member of the Court was not ready to resolve
the affirmative action question on the merits at this point. In that circumstance,
no four Justices were willing to force the issue." Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The
Making of a Turning Point-Metro and Adarand, 84 CAL. L. REV. 875, 886
(1996).
Professor Mishkin's observation probably remains valid despite the
Court's recent grant of certiorari in another affirmative action case. See Taxman
v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1551 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. granted, 117
S. Ct. 2506 (1997). Taxman, unlike Hopwood, involved layoffs, not admissions or
hiring, a distinction the United States Supreme Court has found significant. See
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
51. Brest & Oshige, supra note 13, at 865.
52. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Prefer-
ence in Law SchoolAdmissions, 75 COLuM. L. REv. 559, 582-83 (1975).
53. See Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Re-
claiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REv. 953, 1002 (1996).
54. See Duncan, supra note 14, at 533-39.
55. See id. at 534.
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3. Merit is biased
A third justification for race-based affirmative action is that it
partially ameliorates the unfair bias created by "merit." 6 Under this
theory, the concept of merit is itself biased, "neither fair nor demo-
cratic, neither genuinely predictive nor functionally meritocratic. ' ' 7
One target of this attack is standardized tests such as the Scho-
lastic Aptitude Test (SAT) or the Law School Admissions Test
(LSAT)."8 Because boys consistently outscore girls, and whites con-
sistently outscore blacks on the SAT, critics contend these tests ex-
hibit gender and racial biases. 9
In addition to these alleged biases, or perhaps because of them,
performance on standardized tests does not accurately predict first-
year law school or college performance.' Professors Sturm and
Guinier note that studies show the correlation" between SAT scores
and first-year college grades is about .32 to .36, accounting for ap-
proximately 10% to 12% of the variance in performance.62 This cor-
relation is consistent with the .3 correlation observed by Professor
Selmi."
A common criticism of the studies showing this small correlation
is that they fail to take into account the restriction on range. The
correlation between test scores and college performance is weakened
because the sample population of students in the university does not
56. See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 53, at 968.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 969-70.
59. See, e.g., id. at 982 (arguing that standardized exams test applicants on the
assumption that there is only one way to do a job, thus excluding those applying
different approaches, like women and people of color); Katharine Q. Seelye,
Group Seeks to Alter S.A. T. to Raise Girls' Scores, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1997, at
A25. But see Daniel Seligman, Brains in the Office, FORTUNE, Jan. 13, 1997, at
38, 38 (discussing the strong predictive performance of the United States De-
partment of Labor's General Aptitude Test Battery).
60. See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 53, at 971-74.
61. The correlation between variables is roughly speaking, "an absolute
measure of the relationship between two variables .... If large values of X tend
to be accompanied by large values of Y and vice versa, then... their correlation
coefficients will be positive." M.G. BULMER, PRINCIPLES OF STATISTICS 74
(1979).
62. See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 53, at 971. "'The square of the correla-
tion coefficient can therefore be interpreted as the proportion of the total varia-
tion in the one variable explained by the other."' Michael Selmi, Testing for
Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate, 42 UCLA L.
REv. 1251, 1263 n.37 (1995) (quoting HUBERT M. BLALOCK, JR., SOCIAL
STATISTICS 409 (Rev. 2d ed. 1979)).
63. See Selmi, supra note 62, at 1264-65.
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include students who did worse on the tests and were denied admis-
sion." Nevertheless, even if this range restriction problem is compen-
sated for mathematically, at best the correlation rises to .5, explaining
only 25% of the variance in performance.'
Moreover, standardized tests typically exhibit an income bias,
meaning that average test scores rise with family income. This in-
come bias skews admissions in favor of the wealthy at the expense of
the poor, while providing little meaningful predictive value." To
some extent, race-based affirmative action counteracts this bias by
including more candidates within the pool of those considered for
admission. 7
The merit theory has also drawn criticism as being biased against
minorities in the "write-on" selection process for a number of law
reviews. Since whites have dominated law reviews, minority students
complain they "are forced to disguise their true voices and write like
white males."' Racial preferences can offset this bias to some extent
by ensuring minorities who do not mimic the writing styles of white
males will still have an opportunity to write on to law review.
III. CLASS-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACrION: THE REMEDY
A. Kahlenberg's Critique of Affirmative Action
Richard Kahlenberg opens The Remedy with a survey of the his-
tory of affirmative action. He notes that after a hundred years of seg-
regation-and hundreds more of slavery prior to that-anti-
discrimination laws proved insufficient to eradicate the continuing
disadvantages blacks faced in society.69 He contends the Civil Rights
Movement of the 1960s sought to overcome these structural obstacles
in a class-conscious manner, rather than a race-conscious one.'
Kahlenberg reinforces this point by referring to noted civil rights
leader Dr. Martin Luther King, who "never endorsed racial prefer-
ences, arguing instead that there were nonracial ways to remedy past
64. See id- at 1266-70.
65. See id. at 1268-70.
66. See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 53, at 987-92. "[]t is incontestable that
the existing meritocracy excludes people based on their race, gender, and class
status." Id. at 996.
67. See, e.g., id. at 998.
68. STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECriONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE AcTION BABY
26 (1991).
69. See KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY, supra note 9, at 3-4.
70. See id. at 8-10.
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racial wrongs. ,
71
Ironically, the shift or emphasis from class to race in the early
1970s occurred at the behest of Republican President Richard Nixon,
who may have initially proposed the use of racial preferences as a
wedge issue to split the labor base and the racial minorities in the
Democratic party.' Although President Nixon ultimately ran against
quotas in 1972, the Democrats picked up preferences as a party plat-
form.73 The initial justification for preferences was compensation;
however, beginning in the late 1970s, the justification switched to di-
versity.7' Thus, where the old view presented race as superficial, the
new vision embraced "race as culture."75
Kahlenberg identifies four reasons for the emergence of diver-
sity as the primary rationale for affirmative action. First, a plan
based on diversity is more likely to pass constitutional muster be-
cause there is no need for extensive fact-finding. 76 On the other hand,
a plan based on the compensation rationale must satisfy fairly strin-
gent fact-finding requirements by identifying specific past discrimi-
nation based on more than anecdotal evidence.'
Second, because diversity is forward-looking, 78 it does not re-
quire a sunset provision. In other words, with diversity as the justifi-
cation, proponents of racial preferences do not have to wrestle with
the difficult issue of whether preferences should end, and if so,
when.
Third, diversity does not involve charges of past injustice and
does not require children to pay for the sins of their parents.' It
therefore avoids the difficulty of showing a causal relationship be-
tween past discrimination and today's minorities. Finally, diversity
71. Id. at 10.
72. See id. at 21-23.
73. See id. at 24.
74. See id at 27-29.
75. Id. at 33.
76. See id. at 38-39.
77. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)
(holding that all federal affirmative action programs must be analyzed under a
strict scrutiny standard); see also City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 505 (1989) (holding that a city affirmative action program could not satisfy
strict scrutiny since the record did not reveal any prior racial discrimination in
awarding contracts).
78. See Eugene Volokh, Diversity, Race as Proxy, and Religion as Proxy, 43
UCLA L. REv. 2059,2060 (1996).
79. See KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY, supra note 9, at 39-40.
80. See id. at 40.
[Vol. 31:213
CLASS-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION.
makes allies of other minority groups, such as women, gays, and lesbians.8'
Kahlenberg then considers whether affirmative action has ac-
complished its intended goals. He gives it a grade of "B-" for genu-
ine equality of opportunity.' Acknowledging that blacks have been
making economic progress," he contends racial preferences are nev-
ertheless both underinclusive and overinclusive' Rich minorities
benefit even though, in Kahlenberg's view, they should not.' Con-
versely, poor whites do not benefit even though, in Kahlenberg's
view, they should.'3
With respect to color-blindness, Kahlenberg gives affirmative
action a grade of "F."" This grade is based on his belief that immu-
table characteristics should not be used as a basis for affirmative ac-
tion unless absolutely necessary." For example, the prevalence of di-
versity as a justification for racial preferences leads Kahlenberg to
question whether there is a black viewpoint. 9 Such questions in-
variably pigeonhole minorities and increase, rather than reduce, the
role of race in society.'
Kahlenberg also gives affirmative action an "F" for reducing
prejudice." He notes that racial preferences imply that blacks and
other favored minorities need help to achieve the same level of suc-
cess as whites.' This perception is sometimes bolstered by the fact
that minorities admitted through affirmative action have higher
dropout rates, lower bar passage rates, and lower scores on teaching
competency exams.93 Finally, "[w]hile affirmative action did not, as
some claim, create David Duke, it does seem to rile whites who
would otherwise take a more positive view of racial progress."'94
Lastly, Kahlenberg gives affirmative action a "C" for compensating
81. See id. at 41.
82. See id. at 42-52.
83. See id. at 45.
84. See id. at 44 (citing Alan M. Dershowitz & Laura Hanft, Affirmative Ac-
tion and the Harvard College Diversity-Discretion Modek Paradigm or Pretext?,
1 CARDOZO L. REV. 379, 416 n.114 (1979)).
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 52-64.
88. See id. at 53-54.
89. See id. at 55.
90. See id. at 58.
91. See id at 64-74.
92. See id. at 65.
93. See id. at 66-68.
94. Id. at 73.
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for past discrimination.95 Diversity, the primary current rationale for
affirmative action, does not even purport to address the problem of
past discrimination; if anything, it is disadvantageous toward certain
minority groups, such as Asians.6
Having catalogued the weaknesses and problems of racial pref-
erences, Kahlenberg proposes a shift from race-based to class-based
affirmative action.
B. Theoretical Justifications
According to Kahlenberg, class-based affirmative action is supe-
rior to race-based affirmative action because it directly compensates
those who have had to overcome financial obstacles. 7 He notes that
"class preferences are actually meant to perfect the meritocracy
rather than subvert it. Whereas a racial preference will unfairly
benefit Bill Cosby's offspring over the son of a white sanitation
worker, class preferences help those who need it."98 This justification
rests on the concept of equal opportunity. Kahlenberg argues that
the poor face real impediments to achievement, impediments that are
not addressed through existing antidiscrimination laws." He cites an
impressive array of statistical and sociological evidence demonstrat-
ing that Americans born into the lower classes are significantly less
likely to move into higher social classes than those initially born into
the higher classes."
Thus, while affirmative action currently benefits affluent
blacks, °' class-based affirmative action would benefit both poor
blacks and poor whites. Because blacks are disproportionately poor
compared to whites, they would benefit disproportionately from
class-based affirmative action.' ° Kahlenberg contends that "by
95. See id. at 74-79.
96. See id. at 75-78.
97. See Kahlenberg, Class-Based, supra note 9, at 1060-61.
98. Id. at 1061.
99. See KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY, supra note 9, at 84-85 ("As long as an-
tidiscrimination laws work, race and gender are not impediments per se, but class
differences... remain .... ).
100. See id. at 88-89 (citing PETER M. BLAU & OTIS DUDLEY DUNCAN, THE
AMERICAN OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE 28 (1967); JOHN A. BRrITAIN, THE
INHERITANCE OF ECONOMIC STATUS 16 (1977); CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, ET AL.,
WHO GETS AHEAD? THE DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC SUCCESS IN AMERICA
81-83 (1979)).
101. See id. at 104; Peter Passell, Surprises for Everyone in a New Analysis of
Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1997, at D2 ("[Miany of the minority
students attending highly selective colleges are from the middle class.").
102. See KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY, supra note 9, at ix-x.
[Vol. 31:213
CLASS-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
helping the most disadvantaged blacks, class-based affirmative action
arguably does a better job of compensation for past discrimination
than race-based affirmative action does."1°3 Although class-based
preferences will not lead to the same level of racial diversity that
race-based affirmative action does, they should avoid causing the ra-
cial hostility and resentment of the latter.'4
Unlike race-based affirmative action programs, class-based af-
firmative action probably does not trigger strict scrutiny because
poverty is not a suspect classification.' Indeed, a number of the cur-
rent Supreme Court Justices seem considerably more willing to up-
hold class-based affirmative action plans than race-based ones.1°"
C. Mechanics of Class-Based Affirmative Action
Like race-based affirmative action, class-based affirmative action
can take a number of different forms. A school could use class as a
"plus" factory in the same way Justice Powell suggested in Bakke
that race could be used.' 4 Alternatively, a school could set aside a
designated number of admissions slots solely for lower-income appli-
cants, operating, in effect, two tracks. The University of Texas
School of Law used this approach with race-based, rather than class-
based, plus factors, resulting in the court's decision in Hopwood v.
103. Id. at 104.
104. See id. at 105.
105. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 26 (1973).
106. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (noting that Justice Scalia and
Justice Thomas favor affirmative action programs based on class); City of Rich-
mond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509-10 (1989) (Justice O'Connor writing
for herself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice Kennedy).
107. A plus factor has been defined as a factor that tips the balance in the mi-
nority's favor, because that person "'can usually bring something that a white
person cannot offer."' Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316-
17 (1978) (quoting Appendix to Brief for Columbia University, Harvard Univer-
sity, Stanford University, and the University of Pennsylvania, as Amici Curiae 2-
3); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,286 (1986) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (paraphrasing Justice Powell's use of the word "plus" in Bakke by
instead using the term "racial considerations"); Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar
Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1745, 1772 (1996) (equating pluses to
considerations).
108. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 ("[R]ace or ethnic background may be deemed
a 'plus' in a particular applicant's file, yet it does not insulate the individual from
comparison with all other candidates for the available seats."). See also Jeff Ris-
tine & Ed Mendel, UC Drops Race-Based Admissions, SAN DINGO UNION-
TRIB., Nov. 7, 1996, at Al (describing the University of California at San Diego's
admissions "bonus" points for the underprivileged).
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Texas.1°9
The plus factor approach seems especially well suited to class-
based affirmative action. Unlike race, which is a discrete trait in the
sense that one is either a minority or not, ° economic disadvantage
encompasses a continuous spectrum. One can be anything from
mildly to severely disadvantaged economically. A plus system takes
relative economic disadvantage into consideration by awarding more
points to applicants from lower income levels.
Conversely, the set-aside approach is probably less well suited to
class-based rather than race-based affirmative action. The set-aside
approach requires a bright-line definition to sort applicants into those
eligible for inclusion and those who are not. An applicant whose
family income is one dollar over the definition receives absolutely no
class-based affirmative action, while another applicant whose family
income is one dollar less receives the full affirmative action benefit-
the same benefit as a third applicant whose family income is only
one-tenth that of the second applicant.
Either way, a key starting point for implementing class-based af-
firmative action is to define and rank economic disadvantage.
Kahienberg proposes three methods for doing so: (1) the simple
definition; (2) the moderately sophisticated definition; and (3) the
sophisticated definition."'
The simple definition of class-based economic disadvantage
considers only family income, as measured by income tax returns.1
2
The moderately sophisticated definition looks to the parents' income,
education, and occupation, because these factors all affect a student's
academic performance."' As to the perceived difficulty of ranking
occupations, Kahienberg notes that "attempts to objectively rank
109. 78 F.3d 932, 936-37 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996); see also
Caplan, supra note 5, at 26.
110. Actually, with the increase in interracial marriages and mixed ethnicity
offspring, the discreteness of race is blurring. See Christine B. Hickman, The
Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, African Americans, and the
U.S. Census, 95 MIcH. L. REV. 1161, 1204 (1997) (describing the effects of the"one drop" rule); Kenneth E. Payson, Comment, Check One Box: Reconsidering
Directive No. 15 and the Classification of Mixed-Race People, 84 CAL. L. REv.
1233, 1257 (1996) (describing the difficulty facing persons of mixed racial back-
grounds in responding to federal surveys); M. Elaine Mar, The Multiracial Op-
tion, HARV. MAG., May-June 1997, at 19, 19 (discussing how one sister received
mail from the Black Students Association while her twin received mail from the
Native American Students Association).
111. See KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY, supra note 9, at 128-29.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 129.
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occupations have been remarkably consistent over time."' 4 The so-
phisticated definition considers "wealth, schooling opportunities,
neighborhood influences, and family structure" in addition to the
three factors from the moderately sophisticated definition."5
Kahlenberg suggests that the sophisticated method should be used
where practical, particularly for academic admissions."6
To his credit, Kahlenberg recognizes his proposal cannot be lim-
ited to university admissions." He suggests employers use class-
based preferences for entry-level positions so as to benefit the vast
number of Americans "who go straight from high school to the job
market."". Because employers are less likely to have access to the
information needed to implement the sophisticated method, Kahlen-
berg advocates using the simple method of defining class."9 How-
ever, he opposes the use of preferences for promotions because that
would be the equivalent of giving race-based preferences for grading
in the academic context. 20
IV. WHY CLASS-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WILL NOT WORK
Having set forth Kahlenberg's proposal, I now argue that class-
based affirmative action will not satisfy either proponents or oppo-
nents of racial preferences. I assume, as Kahlenberg proposes, that
class-based affirmative action is designed to supplant, not supplement,
racial preferences. 2' Subsection A is aimed at race-based affirmative
action supporters. Using the available demographic data, I show that
very few black students will benefit from Kahlenberg's proposal.
Subsection B is aimed at race-based affirmative action opponents and
class-based affirmative action advocates. In Subsection B, I show
that class-based affirmative action suffers from the same general
shortcomings as race-based affirmative action.
114. Id. at 130.
115. ld at 132.
116. See id. at 136.
117. See id. at 125.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 136.
120. See id. at 125. Preferential grading does not occur at universities; once the
university admits students through some preference, the students are on their
own to prove themselves by achieving high grades. See id.
121. See id. at 151. However, Kahlenberg does note that race-based affirma-
tive action may still be necessary in some limited circumstances, such as a narrow
remedy for documented discrimination. See id.
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A. No Aid to Minorities
Supporters of race-based affirmative action are generally wary, if
not outright skeptical, of class-based affirmative action as a "second-
best" substitute for racial preferences.'" This wariness stems from a
number of potential problems with such a system. A recent study by
Linda F. Wightman concluded that abandoning race-based affirma-
tive action would drastically reduce the number of minority students
offered admission to American Bar Association-approved law
schools." Using data from the 1991 pool of applicants, the Wight-
man study found that without race-based preferences the percentage
of black applicants admitted to law schools would have dropped from
26% to 3%.14 Furthermore, the study noted that giving an advantage
to applicants with a lower socioeconomic status would produce a cor-
responding drop in admitted black students."
The University of California's ban on affirmative action took ef-
fect for graduate students entering in the fall of 1997.116 According to
the university's own analysis, a switch from race-based to class-based
affirmative action would have reduced the percentage of blacks in
Berkeley's incoming 1996 undergraduate class from 6.5% to 3%.2
Indeed, the percentage of black students offered admission at Berkeley's
122. See Fallon, Jr., supra note 5, at 1947 ("[Ilf economically based affirmative
action is supported as a 'second-best' substitute for race-based affirmative action,
it is likely to be a distant second-best."); see also Deborah C. Malamud, Class-
Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEx. L. REv. 1847, 1894
(1996) (expressing pessimism "about the operationalization of economic inequal-
ity for purposes of class-based affirmative action"); Frederick A. Morton, Jr.,
Note, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Another Illustration of America Denying
the Impact of Race, 45 RUTGERs L. REv. 1089, 1114 (1993) (stating that
"proposals to shift the emphasis of race-based affirmative action from race to
class should be met with extreme skepticism.... particularly when ... advocates
[of class-based affirmative action] historically have not been interested in either
race or class equality"); Glazer, supra note 5, at A12 ("But class-based affirma-
tive action is a bad idea, whose weaknesses become apparent when we review the
areas in which affirmative action operates.").
123. See Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An
Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law
School Admission Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 13-14 & t.1 (1997). See also
Klein, supra note 12, at Al (reviewing Wightman's empirical analysis).
124. See Wightman, supra note 123, at 14 t.1.
125. See id. at 40-45.
126. See Ristine & Mendel, supra note 108, at Al. While admissions offices
were informed in November 1996 that affirmative action would no longer apply,
university president Richard C. Atkinson delayed the changes for undergraduate
admissions to spring 1998 in order to assure a smoother transition. See id.
127. See Caplan, supra note 5, at 28.
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law school dropped from 9.5% to 1.8% for the 1997 entering class."'
An unpublished analysis by a Harvard economist concluded that "to
replicate the current level of nonwhite admissions, elite colleges
would have to grant preferences to six times as many low-income
students."' 29 Doing so would "sharply lowerf- average test scores and
displac[e] huge numbers of high-scoring middle-income whites."'
If blacks are disproportionately poor compared to whites, why
does class-based affirmative action result in so little diversity?
1. Income distribution by race
To begin, the statement that blacks are disproportionately poor
may be somewhat misleading. Although a higher percentage of
blacks than whites are "poor"-meaning that a randomly selected
black person is more likely to be poor than a randomly selected white
person-there are a greater number of poor whites than poor blacks
at every income level."' This means that a randomly selected poor
person is more likely to be white than black. In particular, the na-
tionwide numbers for 1995 are as follows:
Table 1: Income Distribution
Family Income White Families Black Families
(1994 dollars) (in thousands) (in thousands)
< $5K 1344 (2.3%) 664 (8.2%)
$5K-$10K 2630 (4.5%) 1036 (12.8%)
$10K-$15K 3624 (6.2%) 906 (11.2%)
$15K-$25K 8533 (14.6%) 1489 (18.4%)
$25K-$35K 8474 (14.5%) 1093 (13.5%)
$35K-$50K 10,812 (18.5%) 1198 (14.8%)
> $50K 23,027 (39.4%) 1716 (21.2%)32
128. See Kenneth R. Weiss, UC Law Schools' New Rules Cost Minorities
Spots, L.A. TIMES, May 15, 1997, at Al (noting that of the 792 students accepted,
only 14 were black, down from 75 the previous year).
129. Passell, supra note 101, at D2 (discussing the findings of Professor Tho-
mas Kane).
130. Id
131. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1996, at 48 tbl.49 (116th ed. 1996) [hereinafter STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT].
132. See id. The number in parenthesis represents the percentage of the total
number of white and black families within each income category.
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Table 1 shows that 21% of black families have family incomes less
than $10,000, compared to 6.8% of white families. Nevertheless,
there are more than twice as many white families in this income cate-
gory. At higher income levels, white families outnumber black fami-
lies by even higher margins.
Based on the income distribution alone, a school could maintain
some racial diversity by setting aside spots for students coming from
those income levels where whites do not greatly outnumber blacks.
For example, among all families earning less than $10,000, whites
outnumber blacks by approximately two to one. Thus, a school could
conceivably set aside 30% of its admission offers for applicants from
that income level, with the assumption that 10% of its class would be
comprised of black students from the lowest income level." As the
number of blacks gaining admission through the non-set-aside por-
tion increases, the target percentage of poor blacks decreases.1"
2. Test scores by race and income
There are a number of hidden assumptions in analyzing test
scores by race and income. The major problem with such an ap-
proach is that it assumes the academic profiles of all low-income stu-
dents are comparable. Empirical evidence belies this assumption.'
At every income level, whites outscore blacks on standardized tests
133. The 30% set-aside would be divided into 20% for poor whites and 10%
for poor blacks. The set-aside would actually be even greater, since the example
given in the text does not take into account Asians and Latinos. However, as
most of the literature tends to discuss affirmative action issues in white/black
terms, I do so as well. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
134. Mathematically, the formula would work as follows:
S = [(W + B) / B] x T
where:
W = the total number of white families in the income level(s) considered
for preferential treatment;
B = the total number of black families in the same income level(s);
T = the target percentage of black students among the general population;
and
S = the necessary percentage of spots to be set aside for class-based ad-
missions.
For example, where a school seeks 10% black students through a set-aside and
the school selects $10,000 to be the class-based admissions limit, using the census
statistics yields: T = .10, W = 3,974,000, B = 1,700,000, and S = 33.4%.
135. See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 53, at 989 (showing that the combined




such as the SATY6
Table 2: 1996 Mean SAT Scores by Race and Family Income
Family Income White Black Difference
< $10K 977 788 189
$10K-$20K 985 817 168
$20K-$30K 1004 848 156
$30K-$40K 1014 868 146
$40K-$50K 1030 888 142
$50K-$60K 1042 907 135
$60K-$70K 1059 913 146
$70K-$80K 1072 927 145
$80K-$100K 1090 950 140
> $100K 1129 1007 122w
According to Table 2, the smallest difference in SAT scores between
whites and blacks at the same income level is 122 points, and that is
for students from families with incomes of $100,000 or more. At the
income levels more likely to qualify as disadvantaged under Kahlen-
berg's proposal-for example, under $40,000 per year-the differen-
tial ranges from 146 points to 189 points. Note that the disparity in
scores between whites and blacks is so severe that only blacks in the
annual income level exceeding $100,000 attain an average SAT
score-1007-that is greater than that of whites in the very poorest
136. This is not a particularly new insight. See id. The existence of the dispar-
ity in test score performance is an extremely controversial and complex issue. A
minority of scholars contend that the disparity simply reflects differences in cog-
nitive ability among the various races. See RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES
MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMER-
ICAN LIFE 269-340 (1994). Professors Herrnstein and Murray note that blacks
and whites of equal age and intelligence quotient (IQ) earn approximately the
same annual income. See id at 323. Also, they assert that blacks of average IQ
are actually more likely to earn college degrees than whites of the same IQ. See
id. at 320.
This incendiary work has been carefully dissected. THE BELL CURVE
DEBATE: HISTORY, DOCUMENTS, OPINIONS (Russell Jacoby & Naomi
Glauberman eds., 1995) contains a number of good critiques and criticisms of its
shortcomings.
137. See COLLEGE ENTRANCE EXAMINATION BOARD & EDUCATIONAL
TESTING SERVICE, 1996 COLLEGE SENIORS: A PROFILE OF SAT PROGRAM
TEST TAKERS, at tbl.4-2 (1996) [hereinafter SAT PROFILE] (on file with Loyola
of Los Angeles Law Review). The score range for the SAT is 400 to 1600.
November 1997]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
category-977.
The impact of the disparity in scores is even greater when one
examines the data more carefully. For example, at the annual income
level of less than $10,000 the standard deviation for white students is
104 for verbal and 107 for math, while the mean scores for white stu-
dents are 487 for verbal and 490 for math.138 Since the mean verbal
and math scores for blacks at this income level are 398 and 390 re-
spectively, blacks at the same income level are almost a full standard
deviation below whites. 39 The standard deviation is best described as
the spread in data points such that 68% of all data points will fall
within one standard deviation of the mean.' 4 Thus, 68% of black
students in the lowest income level scored between 304 points and
492 points on the verbal portion of the test; only about one-sixth of
black students scored above the mean verbal score for white students
in the same income range. Similarly, 68% of black students in that
income category scored between 302 and 478 on the math portion of
the test; less than one-sixth scored above the mean math score for
whites. Alternatively, approximately one-fifth of white students in
this income range scored below the mean score for black students.
These disparities also exist in the annual income levels between
$10,000 and $30,000. Between $10,000 and $20,000 per year, the
standard deviation for blacks was 94 in verbal and 89 in math. This
barely surpasses the 83 point gap between mean scores of whites and
blacks in verbal, and the 85 point gap in math.14' Between annual in-
come levels of $20,000 and $30,000 per year, the standard deviation
for blacks was again 94 in verbal and 89 in math, compared to a gap
in mean score between whites and blacks of 74 points and 82 points in
verbal and math respectively.1
41
Actually, the picture is even bleaker. I have presented the data
in a way that implies a one-to-one correspondence between whites
and blacks. However, at less than $10,000 per year, white families
outnumber black families 2.34 to .'43 This factor must be adjusted by
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See SAM KASH KACHIGAN, MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 47
(1982).
141. See SAT PROFILE, supra note 137, at tbl.4-2.
142. See id.
143. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 131, at 48 tbl.49 (illustrating that
in 1995 the number of white families with an annual income less than $10,000 was




the fact that at this income level black families appear to be larger
than white families, resulting in a ratio of white to black children of
1.70 to 1.'" Thus, in a sample population of 170 whites and 100 blacks
in this income level, the statistics suggest only 16 black students
would score above the mean math and verbal scores for white stu-
dents, while approximately 85 white students would score above 977
points.4' In other words, black students would make up roughly 15%
of the applicant pool scoring above 977 points.
Assuming that admissions programs continue to use high school
grades and standardized test scores as the primary admission criteria,
the beneficiaries of a race-blind, class-based affirmative action pro-
gram are likely to be overwhelmingly white.
3. Test scores by parental education and race
Kahlenberg's moderately sophisticated and sophisticated meth-
ods both incorporate parental education into the calculation.' 4 His
theory is that parental education is strongly indicative of the level of
obstacles faced by students.'
Table 3: Education Distribution by Race (in thousands)
Parents' Education Whites Blacks
Less Than 9th Grade 3283 280
Some High School 5239 2108
High School Degree 17,164 3841
Some College 14,414 2862
College Degree 8570 758
Graduate Degree 4995 236'4
Note that, as a group, blacks have less education than whites, 49
144. See id. at 66 tbl.82.
145. I say "approximately" because 977 is the mean score for white students,
representing the average score and not the median score, which would corre-
spond to the score received by the person at the 50th percentile. However, for a
normal distribution the mean and median are the same. See EDwIN L. CROW ET
AL., STATISTICS MANUAL 11 (1960).
146. See KAHLENBERG, TH1E REMEDY, supra note 9, at 128.
147. See id. at 129.
148. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 131, at 66 tbl.82. The educa-
tional level is for the head of the household in married situations.
149. For example, 52% of whites have some college education while only 38%
of blacks have the same amount of education. See id.
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suggesting that blacks may benefit disproportionately from Kahlen-
berg's definition of disadvantage. On closer examination, the num-
bers are less favorable to blacks than Kahlenberg implies. Blacks are
disproportionately overrepresented only in the groups with some
high school education, or a high school diploma but no college edu-
cation. However, they are not overrepresented in the group with the
very least amount of education-no high school. Unless this group is
ignored, blacks will not be significantly overrepresented among the
less educated.
Worse yet, as shown in Table 4, whites outscore blacks at every
educational level.
Table 4: 1996 Mean SAT Scores by Parents' Education and Race
Parents' Education Whites Blacks Difference
No High School Diploma 908 767 141
High School Degree 981 825 156
Some College 1003 853 150
College Degree 1073 900 173
Graduate Degree 1128 950 1781
The score disparity among less-educated families is not as severe as
when family income is considered alone."' However, it is still large
enough to expect that the overwhelming majority of beneficiaries of
class-based affirmative action would be white students from less edu-
cated families.
As with the breakdown for race and income, class-based af-
firmative action based on this criteria is likely to benefit whites from
less educated families, rather than blacks from such families.
4. Constitutionality of a targeted program
I have suggested above why class-based affirmative action is ex-
tremely unlikely to create any sort of racial diversity. Admittedly,
Kahlenberg, and probably other proponents of class-based affirma-
tive action, are not primarily concerned with racial diversity as a
150. See SAT PROFILE, supra note 137, at tbl.4-2.
151. Compare Table 2, supra text accompanying note 137, with Table 4, supra
text accompanying note 148. This assumes that the least-educated will also be
earning in the lowest income bracket, which may not always be true.
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goal."2 Nevertheless, those favoring race-based affirmative action
may seek to overcome race disparity in test scores by choosing the
factors defining economic disadvantage in such a way that applicants
qualifying for the class-based affirmative action are overwhelmingly
minorities. Texas legislators "openly talk about trying to craft an
admissions formula that will 'zero out' the effect of the legal ban on
race preferences."'5 3
For example, blacks are overrepresented in a number of occupa-
tions.
Table 5: Black Representation in the Workforce
Occupation Percentage of Workforce
Nursing Aides & Orderlies 30.7
Taxicab Drivers 25.5
Postal Clerks 25.1








Data Entry Keyers 19.51-4
Nationwide, blacks represent about 10.1% of the workforce.5 Act-
ing on this information, a school could, consistent with Kahlenberg's
moderately sophisticated definition of economic disadvantage, con-
sider those occupations listed in Table 5, and perhaps only those, to
152. See, e.g., Stephen R. Shalom, Rectifying Policies, THE PROGRESSrVE, Nov.
1996, at 41, 43 (reviewing KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY, supra note 9).
153. Zachary, supra note 10, at Al. Texas state legislators have a bill pending
that would require all public universities to admit students in the top 10% of
their high school classes. See id. Theoretically, this should increase racial diver-
sity because some high school student bodies are predominantly minority,
meaning that the top 10% of those classes will be predominantly minority as
well. See Jayne Noble Suhler, Educators Say Cash, Not Law, Needed to Diversify
Colleges, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 10, 1997, at 1A.






If successful, such an approach disparately impacts white appli-
cants. However, disparate impact does not form the basis for an
Equal Protection violation.'n In Washington v. Davis, the Court up-
held the District of Columbia's use of a verbal skills test for police
applicants despite the fact that four times as many blacks as whites
failed the test.'8 The Court noted that the verbal skills test was
"neutral on its face and rationally may be said to serve a purpose the
Government is constitutionally empowered to pursue."''  Although
in some instances a disparate impact could be so practically impossi-
ble to explain on non-racial grounds, and although impact is not ir-
relevant, "[s]tanding alone, it does not trigger the rule... that racial
classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny..'... Even a
showing that a school is aware that its choice of factors for class-
based preferences'will have a disparate impact on white applicants
may not be sufficient to establish an Equal Protection violation."'
Thus, in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, the Court upheld an
employment preference granted to military veterans despite the fact
that 98.2% of then-veterans were male.62 However, there would be a
different result if a plaintiff could show "that the decisionmaker...
selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part
'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an iden-
tifiable group.""
It is questionable whether an admissions plan focusing on these
factors would survive judicial review. At a basic level, it is apparent
that the hypothetical school would implement such a plan "because
of" and not "in spite of" the effect it would have on minority admis-
sions. In Feeney, the fact that most veterans were males did not nec-
essarily mean that Massachusetts had merely come across an ex-
traordinarily effective way of discriminating against women. The
state could have deemed veterans worthy of special treatment be-
cause of gratitude for their service to the country. However, the use
of the above factors does not lend easily to such reasoning. For ex-
ample, why would hotel maids count as low-income wage earners, but
156. See KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY, supra note 9, at 129.
157. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,242 (1976).
158. See id. at 237-38.
159. Id. at 246.
160. Id at 242 (citation omitted).
161. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,279 (1979).




not waitresses? Indeed, a primary reason the verbal skills test in
Davis was upheld was because it assessed communication skills,
which were a desired component of the job.'6'
This is where Hopwood v. Texas' s assumes center stage. In
Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit shocked the academic and legal commu-
nities when it struck down the use of race-based affirmative action in
the University of Texas' law school, after concluding that "Justice
Powell's view in Bakke is not binding precedent."1"
The law school at the University of Texas essentially employed a
three-tier admissions policy.167 For the middle discretionary group,
the school used a two-track evaluation system, one for whites and
non-preferred minorities, and another for blacks and Latinos." The
university defended its race-conscious admissions policy on the
ground that it was necessary to achieve racial diversity in the law
school, and that Bakke, which held diversity was a compelling educa-
tion interest,1 69 was law and controlling "at least in the context of
higher education."'70 The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument. First
it noted that no other Justice joined Justice Powell's opinion in
Bakke, and subsequent cases questioned the continued viability of
that understanding of Bakke." The initial blow was Wygant v. Jack-
son Board of Education'2 in which another fractured Court held that
racial preferences in layoffs were not narrowly tailored to a means of
achieving racial equality.'n Next, in City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson
164. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 246.
165. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
166. IL at 944. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978), a divided court upheld affirmative action plans in general, while
striking down the particular "quota" system in effect at the University of Cali-
fornia at Davis. See id. at 271-72. Four Justices thought benign race-based pref-
erences were absolutely constitutional. See id. at 368-69 (Brennan, White, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). Four others-Burger, Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens-thought they
violated Title VI. See id. at 408-09 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part). That left Justice Powell in the middle, with his
opinion that rigid quotas were unconstitutional, but flexible "plusses" were ac-
ceptable. See id. at 317-19.
167. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 935. The three tiers were presumptive admit,
presumptive denial, and a middle discretionary group. See id.
168. See id. at 936-37.
169. See id. at 944.
170. Id.
171. See id.
172. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
173. See id. at 283-84.
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Co.,'7 4 the Court held that all state and municipal-based affirmative
action programs should be subjected to strict scrutiny.175 Moreover,
the Court seemed to suggest that, at least for contracting set-asides,
the only compelling justification for racial preferences was remedying
specifically identified past discrimination. 6
The Fifth Circuit recognized that Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC' held that diversity in broadcasting sufficed as an important
federal government interest for intermediate scrutiny;178 however,
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peha179 overruled Metro Broadcasting
on the use of intermediate scrutiny, holding that federal affirmative
action programs would be subjected to strict scrutiny as well."S
Hence, diversity could not be considered a compelling interest, even
under Metro Broadcasting.'
Although Hopwood remains controlling only in the Fifth Circuit,
it nevertheless does not bode well for race-conscious programs. At
the very minimum it suggests that a targeted program of the sort dis-
cussed above may be scrutinized carefully.
5. Abandon test scores?
Considering the disparity in test scores between whites and
blacks of the same income level, it is apparent that Kahlenberg's pro-
posal for class-based affirmative action would result in very few
blacks, rich or poor, benefitting from his preferential treatment.
One solution is to abandon the use of test scores for admissions.
However, few commentators, even those favoring racial preferences,
have advocated doing so.1 n As Professor Epstein notes, "[i]f one
really thinks that these traditional standards are misguided or worse,
then they should be abandoned across the board.""ln Yet, current
174. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
175. See id. at 509.
176. See id. at 488.
177. 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Contructors, Inc. v. Pefla, 515
U.S. 200,227 (1995).
17& See id. at 567-68.
179. 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
180. See id.
181. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944.
182- But see Sturm & Guinier, supra note 53, at 1012. Similarly, a task force at
the University of California recently recommended abandoning the SAT as an
admission criteria on the ground that doing so would increase the number of La-
tinos admitted. See Randal C. Archibold & Richard Lee Colvman, UC Urged to
Drop SATs as Admission Criteria, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1997, at Al.
183. Epstein, supra note 36, at 39.
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racial preferences still use test scores as a basis for differentiating
among applicants of the same race.
If a university were to abandon the use of test scores for class-
based affirmative action candidates, it should abandon them for
regular admissions as well, for the reason noted by Epstein. Al-
though a number of small colleges have done so,"s the vast majority
of major universities still retain the SAT.
Perhaps one obstacle to discarding test scores is a belief that, de-
spite their imperfect correlationu to future performance, these tests
still add predictive value when combined with high school grades.
For example, Professor Klitgaard has noted the following correlation
between future performance and prior grades, and prior grades and
test scores:
Table 6: Performance Correlation
Previous Previous Increase in
Setting Grades Only Grades & Correlation
Scores Due to Test
Scores
College 0.55 (30%) 0.62 (38%) 26%
Medical School 0.41 (17%) 0.52 (27%) 59%
Law School 0.30 (9%) 0.50 (25%) 178%
Graduate School 0.30 (9%) 0.45 (20%) 122%




Table 6 shows that the addition of test scores increases the corre-
lation coefficient with respect to future performance. In the case of
184. According to the National Center for Fair & Open Testing, approxi-
mately 250 universities do not require the SAT for admission applications. See
Muhlenberg Drops SAT Requirement, FAIRTEST EXAMINER (National Center
for Fair & Open Testing, Cambridge, Mass.), Summer 1996, at 1, 12 (on file with
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
185. "[fln highly selective admissions processes, a predictor may have a 'low'
correlation coefficient and still be very useful. On the other hand, if two out of
every three applicants are being selected, a predictor with [a low correlation co-
efficient] may be of little value." KLrrGAARD, supra note 20, at 96.
186. See id. at 97. The numbers in parentheses represent the percentage of
students with performance correlating with the selection criteria. See supra note
62 and accompanying text. The percentage increase in correlation due to test
scores is calculated by subtracting the correlation without test scores from the
correlation with test scores, then dividing by the correlation without test scores.
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law school, the correlation coefficient rises from 0.3 to 0.5, meaning
that the percentage of difference in performance attributable to the
selection criteria rises from 9% to 25%, representing a 178% increase
in correlation. Thus, considering test scores with prior grades can
lead to a significant increase in the ability to predict future perform-
ance, particularly for graduate schools.
Also, universities may be reluctant to abandon test scores be-
cause of the impression that they are not subject to grade inflation.
High school grades have been creeping upward. In 1969, only 12.5%
of first year high school students earned A averages, whereas 31.5%
did so in 1996.1" College grades "have become so suspect that gradu-
ate schools now give more weight to applicants' standardized-test
scores and personal recommendations.""' The director of admissions
at the University of California at Berkeley -agrees that the SAT
serves as an objective counterweight against grade inflation.189
If anything, standardized tests appear to be gaining support
among secondary school educators.'90 Chicago recently instituted a
requirement that students "pass standardized tests in core courses to
get credit for each year's work, regardless of grades awarded by
teachers.. 9. Similarly, California Governor Pete Wilson threatened
to veto the 1997-1998 state budget unless legislators agreed to im-
plement standardized testing of all public school students.
12
6. Class as a second-best alternative for race
In the beginning of this subsection, I noted that proponents of
race-based affirmative action viewed class-based affirmative action
skeptically, as nothing more than a second-best alternative." In
other words, if racial preferences are going to be eliminated alto-
gether, class-based preferences may preserve some modest amount of
racial diversity.
187. See Kenneth R. Weiss, Survey Finds Record Stress in Class of 2000, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 1997, at Al.
188. William M. Bulkeley, Would Tax Plan Further Inflate College Grades?,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 1997, at Bi; see also KLrrGAARD, supra note 20, at 11
(noting grade inflation in the late 1960s and early 1970s).
189. See Elaine Woo, Debating the Inflation Situation, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 3,
1997, at B2.
190. See, e.g., Sturm & Guinier, supra note 53, at 978-79.
191. Rosalind Rossi, Board OKs New Tests to Strengthen High Schools, CHI.
SuN TIMEs, Mar. 27, 1997, at 14.
192. See Dan Morain & Max Vanci, Wilson, Legislators Near Deal on School
Testing, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1997, at Al.
193. See supra Part IV.A.
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I have already demonstrated that class is a very poor substitute
for race."' The number of blacks that must be admitted through
class-based preferences depends, of course, on how many will be
admitted without any preferences. This number, or rather percent-
age, will vary from school to school, but at highly competitive schools
it appears to be about 1%."95 Thus, to produce a class with 6% blacks,
a school would have to admit 5% through a class-based affirmative
action program. To do so, it would have to designate approximately
35% of its slots for the program!96 Such a large designation is ex-
tremely unlikely. In 1994, only 20% of the students in the University
of California system were admitted through affirmative action.' 9
Using this figure for class-based affirmative action, we would expect
blacks, in a black-white model, to comprise only about 4% of the
class.'9
It is worth asking whether 4% is better than 0%. Proponents of
racial preferences often speak of the concept of "critical mass":
A minority group (especially one that has traditionally been
discriminated against) is easily marginalized when it main-
tains only a small presence in a larger population; its con-
tinued presence and survival is in constant jeopardy, requir-
ing outside intervention and assistance to prevent
extinction. As the group's presence and level of participa-
tion grows, at a particular point the perspective of members
of the minority group and the character of relations be-
tween minority and majority changes qualitatively.'99
194. See supra Part IV.A.1-3.
195. See CARTER, supra note 68, at 11 (projecting that only 1% of Harvard's
entering class would be black); Peter Applebome, In Shift, U.S. Tells Texas to
Obey Court in Barring Bias in College Admissions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1997, at
A9 (noting that approximately less than 1% of the University of Texas law
school's offers of admission in the fall of 1997 would go to blacks).
196. I reach this conclusion because roughly 15% of the applicant pool scoring
above the mean for lower-income white students will be black. Fifteen percent
of 35% is approximately 5%. See supra Part IV.A.2.
197. See Cathleen Decker, Affirmative Action is Under Fire, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
19, 1995, at Al. Note that this figure represents admissions based on all catego-
ries of affirmative action, not just affirmative action for blacks.
198. This approximation is as follows: as noted earlier, about 1% of those
admitted without preferences will be black students. Of the 20% admitted
through class-based preferences perhaps 15% will be black students based on the
earlier analysis. Fifteen percent of 20% is 3%.
199. Henry Etkowitz et al., The Paradox of Critical Mass for Women in Sci-
ence, SCIENCE, Oct. 7, 1994, at 51, 51; see also Brest & Oshige, supra note 13, at
856 n.4; Fallon, Jr., supra note 5, at 1930; see generally Amar & Katyal, supra
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Critical mass is the point at which the minority-majority group inter-
actions change.2 It appears that the critical mass for a minority
group is at least 15%,"° a figure that class-based affirmative action
will not come close to producing. Therefore, the few black students
who do gain admission will likely feel marginalized.
Moreover, the assumption is that every black student admitted
to a particular institution will choose to attend that institution. In
reality, this is far from likely to occur, simply because no school will
be able to enroll every student who is admitted, as those students will
have been admitted to other schools as well.' With respect to racial
diversity, however, institutions that have minority populations far
below critical mass are likely to have difficulty persuading those mi-
nority students who are admitted to enroll.
For example, only 11 black students were admitted after the
Hopwood decision eliminated race-based affirmative action at the
University of Texas' law school.O Even if all 11 had chosen to at-
tend, they would have comprised just over 2% of the 500 student
class,25 a number far below the critical mass threshold. Perhaps as a
result, only 3 of the 11 chose to attend.m One of the 11 originally
committed to the University of Texas, but after learning that he had
been the only one to do so at the time, changed his mind and decided
to go to Cornell University.2 Another black student, currently en-
rolled at Texas as an undergraduate, expressed regret over his choice
and stated that given the expected dearth of black students at Texas,
"[he] probably would have gone to a predominantly black or a
smaller university." '
Similarly, even with a ban on racial preferences in place, the
note 107, at 1777 ("A critical mass of students of a particular group may be
needed so that other students become aware of the group ..
200. See Etkowitz, supra note 199, at 51.
201. See id.
202- See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
203. See, e.g., Amy Wallace, UC Law School Class May Have Only 1 Black,
L.A. TIMEs, June 27, 1997, at Al (noting that UCLA's law school admitted 21
blacks and 74 Latinos, but only 10 blacks and 41 Latinos accepted the offers of
admission).
204. See S.C. Gwynne & Julie Grace, BACK TO THE FUTURE, TIME, June 2,
1997, at 48,48.
205. See Peter Applebome, Affirmative Action Bar Transforms Law School,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 2, 1997, at A10.
206. See id.
207. See id
208. Peter Applebome, Universities Report Less Minority Interest After Action
to Ban Preferences, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 19, 1997, at B12.
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University of California at Berkeley's law school-Boalt Hall-
admitted 14 black students for the fall 1997 entering class.2 All 14
opted for other schools because, according to current minority stu-
dents who spoke with them, "[e]very one wanted to know how many
other black students had been admitted. They were concerned they
were going to come and be the only [black] person., 210 Of the 48 La-
tinos admitted, only 18 chose Berkeley.211 One student who turned
Berkeley down stated that at the "Admitted Students Day" recep-
tion, he saw "just a big room full of white people" and that the af-
firmative action ban definitely affected his decision.1 2
Moreover, minority students may choose not even to apply to
schools that eliminate race-based preferences. One student's mother
forbade her from applying to the University of Texas' law school
"because of the Hopwood decision" and because "[s]he didn't think
[her daughter] would get fair treatment there. ', 23 University of Cali-
fornia officials also noted "that some of the best prepared, most
competitive students of all ethnicities are opting not to attend UC at
all"
, 2 14
Thus, the anticipated presence, or lack of presence, of minorities
at an institution can itself have a significant effect on the yield rate.2 5
Based on the experiences of the University of Texas and the Univer-
sity of California, schools that replace race-based affirmative action
with class-based affirmative action run a significant risk of losing mi-
nority students to schools that have retained traditional affirmative
action. The end result of class-based affirmative action would be to
depress the yield rate lower-to zero in some instances-thereby fur-
ther decreasing or eliminating racial diversity.
B. Meritocratic Principles
The previous subsection demonstrated that class-based affirma-
tive action would be a disaster for those who favor race-based prefer-
ences. In this subsection, I argue that those who oppose race-based
preferences should also oppose class-based preferences because the
209. See Amy Wallace, Fallout From UC Preferences Ban, L.A. TIM s, June
28, 1997, at Al.
210. Id. (alteration in original).
211. See id
212. Id.
213. Applebome, supra note 208, at B12.
214. Wallace, supra note 203, at Al.
215. The yield rate refers to the percentage of admitted students choosing to
attend that institution.
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arguments commonly advanced against race-based preferences also
apply to class-based preferences.
1. Overcoming obstacles
Recall that supporters of class-based affirmative action argue
that their approach is superior to race-based affirmative action be-
cause it targets those who are truly disadvantaged."6 Essentially,
class-based affirmative action proponents focus on who faces greater
obstacles to meritorious achievement, rich blacks or poor whites.2"7
Their answer, of course, is the latter.
Is this a plausible assumption? Consider that in response to a
survey by Professor Andrew Hacker, "white college students regu-
larly report that if they were suddenly to become outwardly black
while they inwardly remain who they were, reasonable compensation
would be one million dollars a year for life!, 218 It is difficult to imag-
ine that the obstacles faced by being poor, putting aside the relative
nature of poverty, are so severe that the typical college student would
ask for one million dollars a year to endure them. Indeed, one mil-
lion dollars alone, in the first year, would seem to erase the obstacle
of poverty completely.
I should point out that this one million dollars a year demand is
exaggerated. Professor Hacker's question is phrased in such a way
that it does not elicit the actual indifference point from the subject.
This is because the subject can demand any amount of money in re-
sponse.2 9 The question should be rephrased as follows to determine
216. See supra Part III.B.
217. See KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY, supra note 9, at 44.
218. Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers
Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REv. 733, 769 (1995) (citing HACKER, su-
pra note 154, at 32); see also Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 1709, 1759 (1993) ("Whiteness, the characteristic that distinguishes them
from blacks, serves as compensation even to those who lack material wealth.");
Johnson, Jr., supra note 14, at 920 (noting that the "one drop" rule preserves the
"trademark" of whiteness).
219. The question Hacker put to students has a fairly detailed background:
You will be visited tonight by an official you have never met. He begins
by telling you that he is extremely embarrassed. The organization he represents
has made a mistake, something that hardly ever happens.
According to their records... you were to have been born black: to an-
other set of parents, far from where you were raised.
However, the rules being what they are, this error must be rectified, and
as soon as possible. So at midnight tonight, you will become black. And this will
mean not simply a darker skin, but the bodily and facial features associated with
African ancestry. However, inside you will be the person you always were. Your
knowledge and ideas will remain intact. But outwardly you will not be recogniz-
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the proper indifference point:
You stand before two doors, one marked "white" and
one marked "black." If you choose the first door, you will
remain Caucasian when you step through. If you choose the
second door, you will become African-American in physical
appearance, though you will remain the same person in-
wardly. Would you go through the door marked "black" if
you were paid $1000 a year? $10,000 a year? $50,000 a
year? $1 million a year?
The point is that one must admit, in the face of such sociological
evidence, that rich blacks still face greater obstacles in life than poor
whites.' Presumably, opponents of racial preferences are uncon-
vinced that the obstacles faced by minorities make them worthy of
preferential treatment. Therefore, due to the transitive property,"
such persons must also conclude that the obstacles faced by the poor
are not worthy of preferential treatment.
Kahlenberg's response to the Hacker survey, relegated to a sin-
gle endnote,m is largely unsatisfying. He challenges Hacker's con-
clusion-that the one million dollars a year is necessary "to buy pro-
tections from the discriminations and dangers white people know
they would face once they were perceived to be black" 2-as un-
tested because Hacker failed to ask black students how much they
would be willing to pay to become white. Kahlenberg suggests that
some blacks might be sufficiently proud of their ethnic heritage that
they would demand to be paid one million dollars a year to become
white: "surely that would not 'prove' that whites are discriminated
able to anyone you now know.
Your visitor emphasizes that being born to the wrong parents was in no
way your fault. Consequently, his organization is prepared to offer you some
reasonable recompense. Would you, he asks, care to name a sum of money you
might consider appropriate? ... [The] records show you are scheduled to live
another fifty years-as a black man or woman in America.
How much financial recompense would you request?
HACKER, supra note 154, at 31-32.
220. In 1959 a white novelist named John Howard Griffin essentially per-
formed Hacker's experiment by darkening his skin through oral medications
until he looked African-American. In all other respects, he remained as he had
been before: diction, social class, education, even his name. His experience, as
one might expect, was quite different after his transformation. See JOHN
HOWARD GRIFFIN, BLACK LIKE ME (1961).
221. The transitive property is a basic axiom of mathematics that if A > B, and
B > C, then A> C.
222. See KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY, supra note 9, at 296 n.54.
223. HACKER, supra note 154, at 32.
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against more than blacks." 4
In answering Hacker's question, Kahlenberg's analysis conflates
two separate motivations into one. Unfortunately, Hacker's question
does not distinguish between internal, subjective feelings and exter-
nal, objective evaluations of societal discrimination. White people
might demand tremendous amounts of money in response to
Hacker's inquiry because they are racists who feel great personal re-
vulsion at the thought of being black, or because they are so attuned
to the discrimination that blacks suffer. With Kahlenberg's reverse
question, though, it seems apparent that a black student who would
demand money to become white would be doing so out of internal
feelings, and not a belief that society discriminated against whites.
Moreover, Kahlenberg's thesis may not be true. A black news-
paper editor has suggested that if two doors were set up, with the
right door "list[ing] all the advantages of being white in America"
and the left door "list[ing] all the disadvantages of being black in
America" but with a sign reading "AFFIRMATIVE ACTION,"
"[e]verybody would be taking that door on the right... [i]ncluding
me. ,,m
There is also a second severe problem with the "true obstacle"
justification. Even if one remains unconvinced that the obstacles
faced by rich blacks do not exceed those faced by poor whites, there
remains the additional question of whether poor blacks face greater
obstacles than poor whites. Since Kahlenberg admits that he believes
blacks face greater discrimination than whites,m it follows that the
playing field would not be leveled unless poor blacks received the
highest level of preferential treatment. Yet, this conclusion under-
mines Kahlenberg's original assumption that race-based preferences
can be replaced completely by class-based preferences.
2. Lowering of standards
One of the strongest arguments against race-based affirmative
action is that it is subversive to the notion of a meritocracy. Conser-
vative Senator Jesse Helms contends that affirmative action "'flies in
the face of the merit-based society [envisioned by] the Founding
Fathers."'"' Similarly, Glynn Custred, co-author of California's
224. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY, supra note 9, at 296 n.54.
225. Norman A. Lockman, Lockman: 'Let's get color-blind', GANNETr NEWS
SERVicE, Aug. 17, 1995, at 1, available in 1995 WL 2904062.
226. See KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY, supra note 9, at 296 n.54.
227. Woo, supra note 22, at Al (quoting Senator Jesse Helms).
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Proposition 209,2 argues for "'advancement by merit"' and for peo-
ple to "'get ahead by what they can do. ' '
It is ironic that affirmative action opponents might support an
affirmative action program that is equally subversive to a meritocracy
as racial preferences. As noted by Professor Klitgaard, race-based
preferences may have an unhealthy trickle-down effect.m By lower-
ing their standards for minority applicants, top tier schools are ad-
mitting students who would be competitive at lower tier schools."l
Consequently, the schools in the lower tiers must lower their stan-
dards to maintain racial diversity, thereby taking minority students
away from the next lower tier. m2 As a result, "[b]lack students at each
school might be a standard deviation below the white students and
therefore might disproportionately occupy positions at the bottom of
the class."23
This trickle-down effect has the potential to plague class-based
affirmative action as well. Like racial preferences, Kahlenberg's
class-based affirmative action creates two tracks for admissions, one
for "standard" admissions and one for the "poor." However, even
within the poor track, admission is determined on the basis of relative
objective merit; among those students who are deemed poor, the
ones with the highest test scores and highest grades will be admitted.
Thus, the relatively less disadvantaged will be the ones to benefit
from the class-based preferences.
For example, suppose that every university implemented
Kahlenberg's proposal for class-based affirmative action with poor
being defined, for the sake of simplicity, as family income of less than
$30,000 per year. From Table 2, note that, on average, SAT scores
rise with increased family income. Therefore, poor students coming
from families with the highest family income, though still under
$30,000 per year, will, as a group, achieve the highest scores among
the poor. Therefore, they will be admitted to the top universities
based on income level and merit.' Because these students are
228. Proposition 209 sought to eliminate California's race-and gender-based
affirmative action programs in education and public employment. See
CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION 30 (Nov. 1996).
229. Woo, supra note 22, at Al (quoting Glynn Custred).
230. See KLITGAARD, supra note 20, at 175.
231. See id. at 174.
232. See id. at 175.
233. Id.
234. This phenomenon occurs with black high school students who achieve
scores that would rank as good, though not spectacular, for white students. For
example, a black student who was valedictorian of his class and scored 1200 on
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admitted through class-based preferences, their test scores and high
school grades suggest that they are less qualified than students admit-
ted without preferences, and will do worse in school. While the first
group of economically disadvantaged students will be struggling at
the highest tier schools, the next group of disadvantaged students will
be admitted to lower tier schools-the level at which the first group
of students might have been competitive. This second group of eco-
nomically disadvantaged students might have been competitive at the
third highest tier of schools, but will struggle at the second tier, and
so on. Thus, at every level, Kahlenberg's proposal admits socio-
economically disadvantaged students to academic settings where
their objective qualifications lead to the expectation that they will
struggle.
This is the same "lowering of standards" objection to racial pref-
erences, only in a different guise. Assuming that one believes in the
ability of test scores and high school grades to predict college per-
formance-and those who argue that affirmative action results in the
admission of the less qualified do-Kahlenberg's class-based af-
firmative action simply lowers standards for a different group of ap-
plicants: the poor rather than minorities.
Kahlenberg admits that "[tihere is some truth to this criticism." '
He responds very briefly by noting that preferences should apply to
the working class in addition to the underclass.n6 He also recom-
mends that "recipients of university preferences ... be required to
take a rigorous summer course (to be prepared). ' In addition, he
suggests that "we should not underestimate the capacity of poor and
working-class kids to do well." 3
Because Kahlenberg does not provide anything more than a
thumbnail response to this criticism, it is difficult to analyze it in any
detail. However, it is doubtful that one rigorous summer course can
offset twelve years-from first grade through high school-of educa-
tional disadvantage. If educational disadvantage was so easily
the SAT received recruiting telephone calls every night from students and ad-
missions officers from multiple Ivy League and elite private universities. See
Brian McGrory, Pathways to College, BOSTON GLOBE, May 23, 1995, at 1; see
also Tom Morganthau, The University: Losing Ground in the Scramble for
Qualified Black Applicants, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 3, 1995, at 30, 31 (discussing the
competition among university admissions officers to attract black students scor-
ing over 1000 on the SAT).
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remedied, one would expect that colleges and graduate schools that
currently admit minority students through affirmative action would
be implementing such "rigorous summer courses" with great suc-
cess.
239
I suggest that it would be highly unlikely that a single summer
course could remedy so many years of disadvantage. Education
builds on prior education. Thus, a weak foundation in early subjects
affects the student's ability to learn future concepts. For example, a
student who, due to poor facilities, subpar teaching, increased stress,
and decreased study time because of poverty, is say, 20% disadvan-
taged in learning addition will be subsequently disadvantaged in math
classes that build upon the rudimentary concepts of addition. Thus,
the student is likely to have difficulty mastering multiplication due to
the 20% disadvantage and the weak addition foundation. By the
time the student moves up to algebra, the 20% disadvantage remains,
but is compounded by the weakness in addition and multiplication.
To repair the damage caused by the years of disadvantage in one
summer would be a Herculean feat.
Moreover, Kahlenberg argues that a socioeconomically disad-
vantaged student who scores a 1000 on the SAT has more potential
than a wealthy student who scores a 1050 with the aid of private tu-
tors.u' This is admittedly true, but not particularly relevant from the
meritocratic perspective currently used to argue against race-based
affirmative action.241 Assuming that a 50 point difference on the SAT
is statistically significant in predicting future academic perform-
ance,2 42 the student from the upper-class family would still be ex-
pected to do better than the socioeconomically disadvantaged stu-
dent, despite the latter's "greater" potential.
239. Consider the situation of graduate school admissions. Even if Kahlenberg
intended to have class-based preferences for graduate programs-it's not clear
that he does-there is likely to be a severe shortage of "qualified" applicants
from low socioeconomic classes. Over the past 25 years, persons in the poorest
quarter and second poorest quarter have had respectively less than 10% and just
over 10% chance of graduating from college by age 24. See Karen W. Arenson,
Aid Cuts Put College Beyond Reach of Poorest Students, N.Y. TimS, Jan. 27,
1997, at B1.
,240. See KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY, supra note 9, at 100.
241. It is possible that the wealthy student may have suffered from a learning
disability such as dyslexia. However, in general, Kahlenberg's hypothesis is
probably valid.
242. In reality, the SAT has an error measurement of about 30 points in either
direction. See GEORGE H. HANFORD, LIFE wITH Tim SAT: AsSESSING OUR
YOUNG PEOPLE AND OUR TIMEs 33 (1991). Therefore, a 50 point difference is
probably not significant.
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A meritocratic system of university admissions could be based
on individual accomplishment, measured from his or her starting
point. However, from a practical standpoint, determining one's
starting point is likely to produce a significant margin of error. A
formula for converting family income, parental education, geographic
neighborhood, and other socioeconomic factors into an equivalent
"baseline" SAT score would need to be constructed.243 Additionally,
a consistent application of such a meritocratic theory would actually
result in the conclusion that "privileged" students who achieved high
SAT scores had "accomplished" very little, since the baseline for all
such students is likely to be high, given the statistical breakdown dis-
cussed in Table 2.
Finally, Kahlenberg fails to work through the impliQations of the
"accomplishment" theory of merit. Consider his example of a poor
student scoring 1000 on the SAT and a rich student scoring 1050. Es-
sentially, Kahlenberg's argument is that a poor student's SAT score
of 1000, given relative disadvantage, is a greater feat than the rich
student's scoring of 1050, given relative advantage.' However, as
noted earlier, socioeconomic status is not binary. A middle-class stu-
dent is advantaged relative to a poor student, but disadvantaged
relative to a rich one. 5 Thus, a score of 1050 achieved by a middle-
class student would represent a greater accomplishment than a score
of 1050 by a rich student, and perhaps a greater feat than the score of
1000 by a poor student. Yet, Kahen.berg's proposal fails to take into
account the relative differences in wealth between middle-class and
upper-class students.
3. Stigma
Another common argument against race-based affirmative ac-
tion is that it stigmatizes all minorities as unworthy beneficiaries, in-
capable of succeeding without preferential treatment. 6 This alleged
243. One possible method is to average the SAT scores for all students within
the same categories.
244. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
245. For example, a middle-class student may not have been able to afford pri-
vate tutoring.
246. See CARTER, supra note 68, at 50-52 (discussing how affirmative action
adds to the stereotype that blacks are unable to compete with whites in acade-
mia); Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1839, 1903 (1996)
("[R]ace based affirmative action stamps even its worthiest beneficiaries with an
indelible stigma."); Terry Eastland, The Case Against Affirmative Action, 34 WM.
& MARY L. RFv. 33, 42 (1992) ("'Under affirmative action the quality that earns
us preferential treatment is an implied inferiority."'). (quoting Shelby Steele, The
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stigma affects minorities in two ways, internally and externally. The
internal stigma wreaks havoc on the self-confidence of the beneficiar-
ies. Professor Shelby Steele notes:
Under affirmative action the quality that earns us preferen-
tial treatment is an implied inferiority .... In integrated
situations where blacks must compete with whites who may
be better prepared, these explanations may quickly wear
thin and expose the individual to racial as well as personal
self-doubtl 7
Sociological studies indicate that there is some merit to the con-
tention that preferential treatment damages the self-esteem of those
who benefit from it. One survey found that female managers who
felt they had been hired or promoted because of their gender "had a
low level of commitment to the company and experienced a great
deal of conflict over their role in the company."2'
Another experiment using both male and female student volunteers
Content of Our Character: A New Vision of Race in America 116 (1990)) But see
Rupert Barnes Nacoste, Sources of Stigma: Analyzing the Psychology of Af-
firmative Action, 12 LAw & POL'Y 175, 188 (1990) (noting that studies on re-
sponses to affirmative action produce dynamic results); Rodney A. Smolla, The
Ghosts of Homer Plessy, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1037, 1087 (1996) (discussing
how affirmative action emphasizes the value a university places in maintaining a
culturally diverse environment).
247. STEELE, supra note 246, at 116-17 (1990). Professor Steele, an African-
American who opposes race-based affirmative action, has been labeled
"conservative." See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Enormous Anomaly? Left-Right
Parallels in Recent Writing About Race, 91 CoLUM. L. REV. 1547, 1549 (1991)
(reviewing DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST
FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987), CARTER, supra note 68, STEELE, supra, and
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991)); Connie
Leslie, You Can't High-Jump if the Bar is Set Low, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 6, 1995, at
82, 82. For what it is worth, I do not view Professor Steele as distinctly
"conservative" or "liberal" on this issue. He is obviously acutely aware of the
discrimination suffered by blacks in the United States. However, he sees af-
firmative action as a crude and imperfect method of addressing the problems
faced by minorities. As he notes, it erodes the competitive desire of black stu-
dents to excel, because they will be admitted even if they are outperformed by
other races. See Adding up the Negatives of Affirmative Action, STAR TRIBUNE
(Minneapolis), Dec. 16, 1996, at 13A ("Blacks can come into Berkeley with 900
[on the SAT]. Why is he going to develop merit? He'd be an idiot to develop
merit. I wouldn't.").
248. MCWHIRTER, supra note 17, at 66 (citing Thomas Chacko, Women and
Equal Employment Opportunity: Some Unintended Effects, 67 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 119-23 (1982)). In this survey, Chacko polled female managers in the
Midwest and asked them if they felt they had been promoted based on merit or
gender. He then asked them "about their satisfaction with work and their feel-
ings about their coworkers." Id.
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found that females who thought they had been selected on the basis
of merit tended to rate their own performances higher than those
who thought they had been selected because of their gender.249 Each
student was paired with a member of the opposite gender.'0 The per-
son of the opposite gender pretended to be a student but was actually
working for the experimenters.25' The students were told that the ex-
periment involved communication skills." Although each student
was designated a "leader," some were told they had been selected
based on merit from a previously administered test, while others
were told they had been picked so there would be enough women, or
men.s3 Each leader was to look at a diagram and describe it to the
follower, who was to draw it.' The drawings were then "graded" and
each student was told that their group had scored either in the top or
bottom quarter.25 In reality the grading was random2 6 The leaders
were then asked to rate their own performances and asked whether
they wanted to continue as leaders.2"
Whether they had succeeded or failed, the women who were told
they were selected based on gender rated themselves lower than
those who were told they were selected based on merit.2" Moreover,
those who were told they had been selected because of gender tended
to not want to continue as a leader, while those who thought they
were selected because of merit did. 9
The stigma argument applies to class-based affirmative action as
well. Since the beneficiaries of the proposal are in need of preferen-
tial treatment, their objective indicators-test scores and grades-are
likely to be inferior to those of the regularly admitted students. This
differential stigmatizes the beneficiaries of preferences. In addition,
it is almost certain the beneficiaries of class-based preferences will
know or suspect the standards were lowered for them, given the wide
249. See id. at 67-68 (citing Madeline E. Heilman et al., Intentionally Favored,
Unintentionally Harmed?: Impact of Sex-Based Preferential Selection on Self-










259. See id. at 68-69.
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availability of grade and test score information.2s Thus, assuming the
stigma argument is accurate, we can expect the beneficiaries of class-
based preferences will have reason to question their own abilities,
much the same way that racial minorities supposedly question them-
selves.
In addition to the internal stigma, preferences can cause an ex-
ternal stigma-that is, they lower the status of the beneficiaries in the
eyes of others, including future decisionmakers. Professor Steele
contends that:
[M]uch of the "subtle" discrimination that blacks talk about
is often (not always) discrimination against the stigma of
questionable competence that affirmative action delivers to
blacks. In this sense, preferences scapegoat the very people
they seek to help. And it may be that at a certain level em-
ployers impose a glass ceiling, but this may not be against
the race so much as against the race's reputation for having
advanced by color as much as by competence. Affirmative
action makes a glass ceiling virtually necessary as a protec-
tion against the corruptions of preferential treatment. This
ceiling is the point at which corporations shift the emphasis
from color to competency and stop playing the affirmative
action game."'
Stephen Carter, a black Yale Law School professor, decries this ef-
fect of affirmative action as "The Best Black Syndrome," meaning
that "there's Category A for the smart folks, and Category B for the
best blacks."' 2
Social science experiments validate the existence of this external
stigma. In a 1977 experiment, psychologists found that men consis-
tently rated the performance of women lower if they were told that
the women had been chosen based on gender, not merit.23 Other
surveys have found that the mere mention of the term "affirmative
260. See, e.g., JULIA CASS-LIEPMANN, CASS & BIRNBAUM's GUIDE TO
AMERICAN COLLEGES (17th ed. 1996) (SAT scores); EDWARD CUSTARD ET AL.,
STUDENT ADVANTAGE GUIDE TO THE BEST 310 COLLEGES (1997) (SAT scores);
IAN VAN TUYL, STUDENT AccEss GUIDE TO THE BEST LAW ScHOOLS (1996)
(LSAT scores).
261. STEELE, supra note, 246, at 120-21.
262. CARTER, supra note 68, at 57-58.
263. See MCWHIRTER, supra note 17, at 65 (citing Marsha B. Jacobson & Wal-
ter Koch, Women as Leaders: Performance Evaluation as a Function of Method
of Leader Selection, ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. AND HUM. PERFORMANCE 149-
57 (1977)).
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action" increases white hostility toward blacks."' For example, in an-
other experiment, whites were asked if they thought blacks were irre-
sponsible, and 26% said yes. 5 But when affirmative action was
mentioned first, the number increased to 43%.6
This external stigma also has the effect of eventually eliminating
any benefit that recipients of preferences receive because "[i]f it is
widely known that at least some significant number of blacks have
benefitted from affirmative action, employers will rationally discount
any particular black candidate's credentials by the amount they think
she has benefitted."' 7 Affirmative action proponents respond to this
stigma argument by arguing that "[t]he solution, however, is not to
abandon voluntary affirmative action in hiring, but to extend it to
decisions regarding [work projects] and other internal ... deci-
sions. ' m However, Kahlenberg's proposal does not recognize the use
of preferences beyond entry-level hiring or admission decisions; in
fact, he argues against the subsequent use of preferences. 269
Race is generally easily identifiable, while socioeconomic status
may not be. Students and employees who do not receive preferential
treatment will not have any immediately apparent way of presuming
whether a given person is "less qualified." On the other hand, with
racial preferences, all minorities are stigmatized because they are
easily identifiable as members of a minority group known to receive
preferential treatment. However, this lack of external stigma for
class-based preferences will last only so long as the information
asymmetry exists. If the socioeconomic status of students becomes
known, then the external stigma is likely to arise.
Beneficiaries of class-based preferences will be judged on their
accomplishments if they choose to keep their socioeconomic status
hidden, thus avoiding being stigmatized by classmates and employers.
Admittedly, any given individual may excel in a particular environ-
ment. However, to the extent that test scores and grades bear a cor-
relation to performance, students who are beneficiaries of class-based
preferences begin with a disadvantage relative to their classmates.
264. See SNIDERMAN & PIAzzA, supra note 28, at 102-03.
265. See id. at 103.
266. See id at 102-03.
267. David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Law-
yers in Corporate Law Firms?: An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REv. 493,
604 (1996).
268. Id. at 605.
269. See KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY, supra note 9, at 125.
[Vol. 31:213
CLASS-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
4. Is race different?
Ultimately, Kahlenberg's proposal for shifting affirmative action
from race to class rests on the conclusion that class is materially dif-
ferent from race. In my view, Kahlenberg fails to provide enough
support for this conclusion. Consider Quentin, Benjy, and Jason,
three high school students applying to the same college. Jason is
from a middle-class family and scored 1200 on the SAT. Quentin is
from an upper-class family and scored 1400 on the SAT. Benjy is
from a lower-class family and scored 1000 on the SAT. If Jason loses
out to Quentin, Jason will be disappointed, but will have no basis for
resentment under traditional "meritocratic" principles. Quentin
"earned" his admission spot. However, if Jason loses out to Benjy,
Jason would probably feel that Benjy did not "deserve" to get in with
lower scores. In this regard, Jason's feelings would probably be the
same whether Benjy got in because he came from a poor family or
because he was black.270
Kahienberg's response to this point consists solely of the follow-
ing: "The difference, of course, is that class preferences go to the ac-
tual victims of class injury, mooting the whole question of intergen-
erational justice. In the racial context, this was the type of victim-
specificity for which even the Reagan administration approved com-
pensation.-'" This response is unsatisfying because it fails to explain
why race is different. Kahlenberg himself concedes that blacks
probably face more discrimination than whites. One could argue that
a middle-class black student, relative to Jason, is an actual victim of
race injury. Jason had nothing to do with that race injury, but then,
we might ask, what did Jason have to do with Benjy's class injury?
Nor do I believe that Kahlenberg's assertion that "people should
generally be judged by factors within their control'VZ2 is a sufficient
justification. Race, of course, is an immutable characteristic. How-
ever, many other factors that Kahlenberg considers acceptable, such
as intelligence, are largely beyond one's control as well."S Academic
ability is not within one's control to the extent that there are objec-
tive differences in intellectual talent, which may or may not be meas-
urable by IQ tests or the SAT; otherwise, we would be forced to
conclude that any person who has not been "disadvantaged," could
270. See Michael Kinsley, Class, Not Race: It's a Poor Basis for Affirmative
Action, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1991, at A15.
271. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY, supra note 9, at 178.
272. Id. at 53.
273. See id. at 54.
November 1997]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
have, with enough effort, discovered the general theory of relativity.
Thus, it is not entirely accurate to say generally that we should
not be judged based on factors beyond our control. Rather, the gen-
eral principle probably is that we should not be judged by irrelevant
factors beyond our control. After all, no one would suggest that the
FBI could not choose from only white agents to infiltrate a white su-
premacist group.
In any event Kahlenberg avoids addressing the real inquiry,
which is whether one's class is an irrelevant factor beyond one's con-
trol. As I noted earlier, Kahlenberg provides ample support for the
conclusion that there is not a high degree of social mobility. 4 This
suggests that class may be somewhat immutable.
An analogy to race-based preferences should make this argu-
ment clear. Since race is an irrelevant immutable characteristic,2 75
the argument against affirmative action is that a black student should
not be preferred over a white student because of the black student's
race. In other words, a white student should not be unpreferred over
a black student because of the white student's race. By analogy,
Kahlenberg's class-based affirmative action would result in a middle-
class student losing out in admissions to a lower-class student simply
because of class. Was that middle-class student's class beyond his or
her control? Probably yes.
However, if this is true then Kahlenberg's own criteria suggests
that class, as well as race, is presumptively disfavored. Admittedly,
there may be something more threatening about race than class.
Race has fractured the country more than perhaps any other issue.
The Taxman v. Board of Education" case is an ideal example of
the strong feelings that race-based decisions arouse. In Taxman, a lo-
cal school board faced with budgetary pressure opted to lay off one
teacher from the business department at Piscataway High School.'
Under state law, nontenured teachers were laid off first, followed by
tenured teachers in reverse order of seniority. 8 In this case, by co-
incidence, both candidates for lay off had the same seniority. 9
Rather than use a random selection process, as it would have in all
other instances, the school board invoked its affirmative action plan
274. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
275. See KA-LENBERG, THE REMEDY, supra note 9, at 53.
276. 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997).





as the basis for laying off the white teacher.' The stated reason was
to ensure racial diversity, as the black teacher was the only one in the
business department.2'
The Department of Justice brought the initial Title VII suit in
the district court on behalf of the white teacher, Sharon Taxman, who
joined the suit as an intervenor2m The district court concluded that
the affirmative action plan violated Title VII.m The board appealed,
and at about the same time, the Department of Justice reversed its
position and supported the school board.2 This change in position
led to a firestorm of criticism.'
When one sorts through the rhetoric in Taxman, there is a sig-
nificant issue raised by Chief Judge Sloviter in her dissent: "[Ilt is
questionable whether this case is about affirmative action at all, as
that term has come to be generally understood-i.e. preference based
on race or gender of one deemed 'less qualified' over one deemed
'more qualified.' '  Taxman and the other teacher were in fact
deemed equally qualified by the board.
The Department of Justice's revised position was reviled, despite
the equal qualifications of Taxman and the other teacher. This sug-
gests that race is so disfavored as a selection criteria that there is no
longer broad support for it-if there ever really was-even as nothing
more than a final tiebreaker. Based on this, Kahlenberg might re-
spond that race is in fact more threatening than class.
Had the school board decided to lay off the wealthier of the two
teachers, it is possible that there would have been less of an uproar.
The board could have justified this hypothetical choice by noting that
the richer teacher would be better able to bear the financial impact of
being laid off. However, I doubt that such a decision would strike the
280. See id.
281. See id.
282- See United States v. Board of Educ., 832 F. Supp. 836, 837 (D.N.J. 1993).
283. See id. at 851.
284. See David G. Savage & Ronald J. Ostrow, Layoffs Based on Race Only
Are Backed by Justice Department, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1994, at A4.
285. See Charles Krauthammer, Dodging and Weaving on Affirmative Action,
WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1995, at A25. In late 1997 the Justice Department reversed
its position again, opting to support Taxman as it did before the District Court
although on the narrow ground that this case was not the proper vehicle for revis-
iting the constitutionality of affirmative action. See Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at *7, Taxman, (No. 96-679), 1997 WL
523854 (Aug. 22, 1997).
286. Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1567 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
287. See id. at 1551.
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public as "fair." There seems to be an undeniable appeal to the use
of lotteries as the method of choosing between outcomes.m There-
fore, it is simply not reasonable to conclude that people will accept
losing jobs or academic positions due to class more readily than to
race.
V. CONCLUSION
In reviewing Kahlenberg's book I did not intend to criticize him
for proposing a class-based affirmative action approach. It is com-
mendable that he has developed a plausible system for factoring in
socioeconomic class in academic admissions and entry-level employ-
ment positions. Indeed, the comprehensiveness of Kahlenberg's ap-
proach suggests that if even it is subject to the flaws detailed above,
the entire notion of class-based preferences is something that should
be abandoned. We should strive to come up with new ideas for ad-
dressing the poverty-race conundrum.
Kahlenberg acknowledges that class-based preferences alone are
insufficient to solve the problems of poverty." However, he con-
tends that class-based preferences will make it easier to implement
more comprehensive funding for primary and secondary schools.21 I
am dubious of this conclusion. Apparently, thirty years of racial
preferences have not made it easier to implement any significant im-
provement of poverty and crime in inner cities. Instead, I think it is
likely that Kahlenberg's class-based affirmative action will sap the
political will to take any further steps to address class and race prob-
lems, much as racial preferences appear to have done. In the end,
despite its superficial appeal, class-based affirmative action is a path
that we should not take.
288. Similarly, in the infamous case of United States v. Holmes, the court ac-
tually suggested that where there were too many shipwreck survivors to fit into a
lifeboat, a lottery would have been the appropriate way to decide who to throw
overboard! See United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No.
15,383); LEO KATZ, BAD ACrS AND GuILTY MINDS 20-21 (1987). But see
SMRLEY JACKSON, The Lottery, in THE LOTrERY 291 (Farrar, Straus & Co.
1949) (depicting a horrifying fictional lottery for determining which villager
would be stoned to death).
289. See KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY, supra note 9, at 178-79.
290. See id. at 180.
[Vol. 31:213
